Economic Globalization and Income Inequality Upswings Within 25 Industrial Countries Over 1990-2009: Did the Welfare State Make a Difference? by Auguste, Daniel
Economic Globalization and Income Inequality Upswings Within 25 Industrial Countries Over 
1990-2009: Did the Welfare State Make a Difference? 
 
 
 
Daniel Auguste 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel  
Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department 
of Sociology in the College of Arts and Sciences 
 
 
 
 
Chapel Hill 
2013 
 
 
 
 
Approved by: 
François Nielsen 
Ted Mouw 
Glenn Firebaugh 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2013 
Daniel Auguste 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
Daniel Auguste: Economic Globalization and Income Inequality Upswings Within 25 Industrial 
Countries Over 1990-2009: Did the Welfare State Make a Difference? 
(Under the direction of François Nielsen) 
 
Previous research is divided over whether globalization had an effect on income 
inequality upswings observed in many advanced economies in recent decades, and whether the 
welfare state is redistributive in this era of economic globalization. This paper, using income 
inequality and globalization indicators from 25 industrial countries over 1990 to 2009, found 
that globalization had differential effects on income inequality depending on the method of 
analysis (i.e., fixed-effect versus random-effects estimation), as well as on whether income 
inequality is measured before or after taxes and income transfers. The results also showed that 
the welfare state is still redistributive, and attenuated the effects of globalization on within-
country income inequality in the 25 countries over the period under study. Reassessing the 
liberal economics claim that the welfare state is counterproductive and retards economic 
growth, this study found no evidence that the welfare state hindered economic productivity 
and growth in these countries.
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INTRODUCTION 
The world’s economies have become increasing interconnected in recent decades 
(Greider 1998; Kapstein 1996). Alongside this economic globalization, social scientists have 
documented a growing income inequality between the world’s citizens1, on one hand, and 
between individuals within countries, on the other (Bhalla 2002; Sala-i-Martin and Kolpin 2002; 
Wade 2001). Consequently, there has been a heightened debate among policy makers and 
scholars regarding the role that globalization might have played in this income inequality 
upswing. For example, research documenting the rise of income inequality in advanced 
industrial countries has implicated retrenchment of the welfare state (Beckfield 2006a; Room 
1999), and other domestic factors, such as labor market structures and institutional changes, in 
the income inequality upswings observed in recent decades. It has been argued that 
globalization has weakened the distributive power of the welfare state relative to market forces 
and, consequently, exacerbated within-country income inequality (Beckfield 2006b; Jutila 
2011). Contrastingly, others have argued that the welfare state has remained influential and 
has shaped national economies, stratification, poverty and inequality (Geyer 1998; Wang 2006). 
This paper will review the debate regarding the relationship between globalization and income 
                                                          
1 Controlling for population size, some research has found a decrease in global income inequality in the last 20-30 
years. It has been argued this drop in global income inequality was due mainly to growing income of China, India 
and Indonesia, whose populations represent a significant portion of the world population: Goesling, Brian. 2001. 
"Changing Income Inequalities within and between Nations: New Evidence." American Sociological Review 66:745-
761. Firebaugh, Glenn. 1999. "Empirics of World Income Inequality." American Journal of Sociology 104:1597-1630. 
Berry, Albert, Francois Bourguignon, and Christian Morrison. 1983. "Changes in the World Distribution of Income 
between 1950 and 1977." The Economic Journal 93:331-350.  
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inequality upswings observed in advanced industrial countries in recent decades, and will 
reassess some of the mechanisms through which globalization has been suggested to affect 
within-country income inequality. Moreover, the paper will investigate whether the 
relationship between income inequality and globalization may vary by measures of income 
inequality and by method of analysis. In addition, this study will analyze the effect of 
globalization on both posttax-and-transfer, and pretax-and-transfer income inequality to 
reevaluate the claim that the welfare state might have lost its redistributive power in the face 
of heightened economic globalization. Finally, the paper will reassess the liberal economics 
argument that reductions in income inequality and poverty due to welfare state programs can 
only happen at the expense of economic productivity and growth (Lue 2001). That is, the 
welfare state cannot alleviate poverty or decrease income inequality without causing economic 
stagnation and underdevelopment. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
The following review highlights some of the debate from both the economic and the 
sociology literatures regarding the relationship between globalization and within-country 
income inequality. While globalization may be expressed in many forms, the globalization 
concept used in this paper is restricted to economic globalization. And similar to previous 
scholarship (Alderson and Nielsen 2002; Brady 2009), this study operationalizes economic 
globalization as the increase in international trade, increase in capital mobility and movement 
of labor across countries (commonly measured as increase in immigration). 
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International trade and within-country income inequality 
Some research from both the economic and sociology literatures has argued that 
international trade had no effect on within-country income inequality upswings observed in 
recent decades in industrial countries (Babones and Vonada 2009; Bussmann, de Soysa, and 
Oneal 2005; Dollar and Kraay 2002; Lundberg and Squire 2003). As a result, some research has 
argued that international trade policies should have no impact on within-country income 
inequality (Smeeding 2002). Investigating the effects of imports from less industrial countries 
on the US labor market, Collins argued that there were no clear relationships between 
international trade and wage differentials in the US (Collins 1998). While some scholars 
dismissed international trade as an explanation for the income inequality upswings observed in 
advanced  industrial countries in recent decades, others argued that international trade had 
some effects on within-country income inequality,  but concluded that these effects were very 
small or negligible (Burtless 1995; Katz and Murphy 1992; Krugman, Cooper, and Srinivasan 
1995; Krugman and Lawrence 1993; Lawrence, Slaughter, Hall, Davis, and Topel 1993; Lindert 
and Williamson 2003; Richardson 1995). Not only it has been argued that international trade 
did not increase income inequality, some scholars have argued that international trade 
increased economic growth, and benefited the poor (Dollar and Kraay 2002). The argument is 
that international trade tends to increase economic productivity, which tends to benefit the 
whole society, including the poor [emphasis added]. Moreover, international trade tends to 
increase market competition, which tends to lower prices of goods; lower prices of goods 
would tend to benefit the poor because low income individuals tend to spend a larger portion 
of their income on food relative to higher income individuals (Baily, Burtless, and Litan 1993; 
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Bhagwati and Dehejia 1993). Furthermore, research has argued that not only did international 
trade not increase within-country income inequality, one should expect international trade to 
decrease within-country income inequality (Krueger 1974). The expected decrease would occur 
through the freeing of local economies from local monopolies, which tend to favor the rich at 
the expense of the poor (Krueger 1974).  
Scholars who have dismissed international trade as an explanation for increase in 
income inequality in advanced industrial countries have implicated domestic factors, such as 
changes in social policies, wage distributions, time worked, social and labor market institutions 
and demographic changes, in income inequality upswings observed in industrial countries in 
recent decades (Dollar and Kraay 2002; Smeeding 2002). For example, as opposed to 
globalization forces, increase in single-parent household (Krugman 1997), changes in tax laws 
and monetary policies that favored the rich at the expense of the poor, and changes in 
minimum wage laws in detriment of workers (Danziger and Gottschalk 1993) have been 
suggested as contributing factors in the increase in income inequality observed in the United 
States in recent decades. It has also been argued that political changes, such as the 
strengthening of the power of right wing political parties, accompanied with the decline of 
labor unions (unions tends to protect workers against wages and jobs loses), have contributed 
to income inequality upswings across industrial  societies (Freeman 1991; Hicks and Swank 
1992). Moreover, skill biased technological change has also been implicated in income 
inequality upswings observed in recent decades. It has been argued that technological 
advancements increased the demand for high-skill workers relative to that of low-skill workers, 
which in turn decreased wages for low-skill workers while increasing wages for high-skill 
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workers (Collins 1998; Gottschalk and Joyce 1995). More extreme critics of international trade 
as an explanation for the increase in income inequality dismissed any possible relationships 
between international forces and national economies (Bussmann, de Soysa, and Oneal 2005; 
Qureshi and Wan 2008). For example, Gordon argued that states maintain full control over 
their national economies, and that national institutions are primary drivers of national markets, 
and stated that there has been no evidence that the world has become more economically 
integrated (Gordon 1994b). Contrasting Gordon’s view, other scholars describe the world as a 
global capitalist market that creates winners and losers where, in advanced economies, owners 
of capital and high-skill workers win, while low-skill workers lose, all of which have resulted in 
growing income inequality within-countries (Greider 1998; Kapstein 1996). 
Contrasting the argument that trade had negligibly low or insignificant effects on 
income inequality in advanced industrial societies, a large body of research from the economic 
literature argued that international trade had large and significantly effects on income 
inequality upswings observed in advanced industrial countries in recent decades (Atkinson 
2003; Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1997; Hurrell and Woods 1995; Leamer 1992; Leamer 1994; 
Murphy and Welch 1992; Wood 1991a; Wood 1991b; Wood 1995). These studies argued that 
international trade of goods and services between advanced and less advanced countries put 
workers in advanced industrial countries in direct competition with workers in less industrial 
countries, where wages are relatively low. The economic argument regarding the mechanism 
through which international trade may have increased income inequality in advanced 
economies is that countries that have relatively high endowment in technology would tend to 
export high-skill intensive goods (i.e., goods that use high-skill workers intensively), while 
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countries that have relative low endowment in technology would tend to export low-skill 
intensive goods (i.e., goods that used low-skill labor intensively). Advanced economies are high-
skill abundant, while less industrial countries are low-skill abundant. International trade 
requires countries to specialize in goods with which they have relative competitive advantage.  
Thus, advanced economies would tend to specialize in high-skill intensive goods, while less 
advanced countries would tend to specialize in low-skill intensive goods. Consequently, the 
demand for high-skill workers would tend to increase in advanced economies at the expense of 
the demand for low-skill workers. As a result, employment rates and wages of low-skill workers 
would decrease, all of which would increase within-country income inequality. Moreover, it has 
been argued that trade between less advanced and advanced economies has increased 
deindustrialization in advanced economies—that is, international trade has increased service 
jobs at the expense of manufacturing jobs, which used to provide good wages to low-skill 
workers (Wood 1995). 
In addition, sociological research on international stratification has found a similar 
relationship between international trade and within-country income inequality. Using pooled 
time-series data from 16 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries over 1967-1992, Alderson and Nielsen found that international trade has increased 
within-country income inequality (2002). Using data from 12 western European countries over 
1973-1997, Beckfield (2006b) found that international trade increased within-country income 
inequality, but also that the effect of international trade on income inequality was negative as 
international trade intensified. Other studies found similar effects of import from less industrial 
countries on within-country income inequality in advanced industrial countries (Davis 1999; 
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Fluckiger, Ramirez, Deutsch, and Silber 2002; Gustafsson and Johansson 1999). Using 
unbalanced panel data from 18 post-industrial democracies over 1961-2004, Brady found that 
international trade increased within-country earning inequality. He found that every standard 
deviation increase in international trade was related to 1/5 to 2/5 standard deviation increase 
in earnings (2009). Other research on stratification and poverty in the US has found similar 
effects of international trade on poverty. For example, Moller et al found that international 
trade was positively related to increase in poverty rate in the US (2003).  
As the above literature suggests, scholars have come to divergent conclusions regarding 
the relationship between international trade and within-country income inequality. However, 
most previous research has analyzed the effect of globalization on posttax-and-transfer income 
inequality (Alderson and Nielsen 2002; Beckfield 2006b; Gustafsson and Johansson 1999; 
Nollmann 2006). It is fair to assume that the effect of globalization on income inequality may 
vary by measures of income inequality. Given that labor market institutions tend to affect 
pretax-and-transfer earnings, and that international trade tends to affect labor market 
institutions, such as unions (Baldwin 2003; Brady 2009; Lee 2005; Morris and Western 1999), 
while government programs tend to correct the negative impacts of markets on social welfare 
(Henley and Tsakalotos 1993), one could expect globalization to have differential effects on 
pretax-and-transfer and posttax-and-transfer income inequality. Similar to previous scholarship, 
the present study will investigate the effect of international trade on posttax-and-transfer 
income inequality.  Unlike previous studies, however, this paper will also investigate the 
relationship between international trade and pretax-and-transfer income inequality. Since 
government interventions tend to correct market imperfections, such as correcting inequity in 
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distributive outcomes of the market, investigating the effect of globalization on both posttax-
and-transfer, and pretax-and-transfer income inequality may shed light on the extent to which 
the welfare state might have attenuated the effect of globalization on within-country income 
inequality. That is, assessing the effects of international trade on both measures of income 
inequality may enhance our understanding of how much the welfare state might have mattered 
for the impact of globalization on within-country income distribution in advanced economies in 
recent decades.  
Capital mobility and within-country income inequality 
Increasing capital mobility has been identified as an important feature of economic 
globalization (Bradley, Huber, Moller, Nielsen, and Stephens 2003) and as one of the factors 
affecting income inequality upswings observed in advanced industrial societies in recent 
decades (Alderson and Nielsen 1999; Mahutga and Bandelj 2008). However, some scholars 
have argued that the effects of capital mobility, such as foreign direct investment on within-
country income inequality, depend on a country’s level of development (Milanovic 2005). At 
low initial levels of economic development foreign direct investment may increase income 
inequality, but it may decrease income inequality at high initial levels of development 
(Milanovic 2005). Foreign direct investment may increase income share of the rich faster than 
that of the poor at low initial levels of economic development (measured as GDP per capita); 
however, as GDP per capita increases, foreign direct investment may increase the income share 
of the poor faster than the income share of the rich (Milanovic 2005). Other research has found 
that foreign direct investment had negligible or no effect on within-country income inequality 
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(Bussmann, de Soysa, and Oneal 2005; Qureshi and Wan 2008). Contrastingly, research on the 
relationship between globalization and income distribution in Korea has found a positive 
relationship between inflow of foreign direct investment and income inequality (Mah 2002). 
Others have found foreign direct investment to be positively related to longitudinal trends in 
income inequality in advanced industrial countries (Alderson and Nielsen 2002; Bluestone and 
Harrison 1982; Esping-Andersen 1999; Wood 2001). It has been argued that capital mobility 
may increase income inequality by strengthening the power of capital owners at the expense of 
the state (Alderson and Nielsen 2002; Moller et al. 2003; Sklair 2002). The ability of firms to 
move capital abroad easily may increase the leverage of firms to negotiate tax exemptions from 
the state. Capital mobility has also been argued to increase inequality by weakening labor 
unions, which protect workers against job and wage losses (Alderson and Nielsen 2002). Capital 
mobility may increase the power of capital owners at the expense of workers, where firms may 
receive wage concessions from labor organizations to prevent the shipping of jobs overseas 
where wages are lower (Brady and Wallace 2000; Moller et al. 2003; Sklair 2002). As a result, 
research on US labor market found that outflow of foreign direct investment was related to 
union decline (Lee 2005; Slaughter 2007). It has also been argued that capital mobility may 
increase competition between domestic and international firms, which diminish bargaining 
position of workers and their ability to support unions (Slaughter 2007). Capital mobility may 
also decrease unions by increasing mulitinationality of firms, which may fragment workers and 
render it difficult for workers to organize since unions tend to be stronger at the local level 
(Alderson and Nielsen 2002; Western 1997). Further, it has been argued that capital mobility 
may also increase income inequality in advanced economies by accelerating deindustrialization, 
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as capital mobility increases the likelihood that firms may move their industries overseas where 
wages and taxes might be relatively low (Alderson 1999; Bluestone and Harrison 1982). 
Deindustrialization shifts employment from the industrial sector—which used to provide good 
wages to low skill workers—to the service sector where demand for low-skill workers is low 
(Moller et al. 2003).  
Given contrasting  conclusions regarding the relationship between foreign direct 
investment and income inequality, using a comparatively larger sample of countries (N=25) and 
more recent income inequality data (1990-2009) than previous studies, this paper will reassess 
previous findings regarding the relationship between foreign direct investment and posttax-
and-transfer income inequality. The present study will also contribute to the literature by 
investigating the relationship between foreign direct investment and pretax-and-transfer 
income inequality.  
Immigration and within-country income inequality  
The increasing interconnectivity of the world’s citizens has been accompanied by 
increasing spread of new communication and transportation technology. The spread of new 
communication and transportation technologies has been argued to lower the cost of 
transportation and render it easier for people to move across borders, which has been 
implicated in the increase of foreign born populations across countries (Castles 2002). Scholars 
and policy makers have questioned whether the increase in foreign born populations was 
related to income inequality upswings observed in advanced economies in the recent decades. 
Assessing the relationship between immigration and income inequality in advanced industrial 
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countries would require understanding of the mechanisms through which immigration may 
have affected within-country income distribution. The type of people who migrate, the context 
in which they migrate, and how they fare in the receiving countries may be important in  
understanding the relationship between immigration and within-country income inequality.  
Early research investigating the relationship between immigration and income 
inequality in the US, for example, has mainly been focused on explaining how immigration 
affects wages for low-skill natives (Borjas 1994; Chiswick 1977; Chiswick 1978), but scholars 
have yet to reach a consensus. Studies using census data on relatively small localities in the US 
have found no significant effect of immigration on earning inequality in these localities (Altonji 
and Card 1991; LaLonde and Topel 1991b). On the other hand, using aggregate data from the 
US census over 1980-1995, other research has found that immigration accounted for a 
significant portion of earning inequality between individuals with less than a high school degree 
and those with more than a high school degree in the US (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1992). It 
has also been found that immigration had negligible or no effect on earnings of high school and 
post high school graduates (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1992). The rationale for this insight is 
that immigrants tend to have, on average, lower skill relative to native born Americans, so 
immigration would tend to increase the supply of low-skill worker, and consequently would 
cause wages for low-skill workers to decrease (Borjas 1992; Borjas 1994). Moreover, the effect 
of immigration on income inequality in advanced industrial countries may be a function of time. 
Research has found that at initial time of immigration, foreign born individuals tend to 
experience low economic mobility relative their natives born counterparts, then foreign-borns 
tend to experience upward mobility as time spent in the receiving country increases (Duleep 
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and Regets 1997). Research using Australian census data has found that immigrants earned on 
average less than natives when they first arrived to Australia, but earnings converged to that of 
natives as time spent in Australia increased (Chiswick, Lee, and Miller 2005). Other studies using 
US census data found that immigrants’ earnings converged with US born workers after 10 to 15 
years spent in the US (Chiswick 1978). Other research comparing second generation white 
immigrants with native-born whites found that second generation foreign-born-whites 
experienced greater economic mobility than their native-born white counterparts (Chiswick 
1977). 
In addition, it has been argued that time points of analysis may also influence estimates 
of the relationship between immigration and income inequality (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 
1996; Borjas, Freeman, Katz, DiNardo, and Abowd 1997). Changes in immigration laws may 
affect the type of people who immigrate. Some immigration policies recruit immigrants based 
on their level of skill, while others recruit immigrants based on family ties or based on 
humanitarian grounds. For example, employment based policies tend to favor high-skill 
immigrants and immigrants with work experience, while family reunification immigration 
policies  favor family ties and refugee based policies  recruit based on humanitarian reasons 
(Bleakley and Chin 2004; Green 1999; Kossoudji 1988; LaLonde and Topel 1991a; Lobo and 
Salvo 1998a; Lobo and Salvo 1998b). It has been found that immigrants with employment-
based visas tend to experience higher economic mobility than those with humanitarian and 
family reunification visas (Chiswick, Lee, and Miller 2005; Smith and Edmonston 1997). Thus, 
because immigration policies tend to vary across time the relationship between immigration 
and national income inequality may depend on the time point of analysis.  
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Immigration policies also vary across countries, so one could expect the relationship 
between immigration and income inequality to vary across countries. For example, Canadian 
immigrant policies tend to favor high-skill workers, and as a result it has been found that most 
immigrants in Canada tend to have a college degree, while most immigrants in the US tend to 
have less than a high school degree (Aydemir and Borjas 2007). Thus, international migration 
would tend to lower wages for low-skill workers in the US, while it would tend to decrease 
wages for high-skill workers in Canada. That is, international migration  would tend to increase 
income inequality in the US, while it would tend to decrease income inequality in Canada 
(Aydemir and Borjas 2007). 
The above literature on immigration and within-country income inequality suggests that 
institutional factors, labor market forces and time may matter for the effect of immigration on 
within-country income inequality. Thus, estimates of the relationship between immigration and 
within-country income inequality may produce different results based on the type of method 
used. Methods that fail to control for institutional, labor market forces and time may produce 
biased estimates of the effects of immigration on income inequality. Some studies, controlling 
for country-specific time invariant factors and factors varying across countries, have found 
negligible or no effect of immigration on longitudinal trends in income inequality in advanced 
industrial countries, but they have found a significant effect of international trade on national 
income inequality (Alderson and Nielsen 2002; Brady 2009). Given contrasting conclusions 
regarding the relationship between immigration and income inequality, this study will reassess 
previous findings regarding the effect of immigration on posttax-and-transfer income 
inequality. This paper adds to the literature by investigating the effect of immigration on 
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pretax-and-transfer income inequality. Most research on the relationship between 
international migration and income inequality seems to argue that immigration affects income 
inequality mainly through the labor market, such as by displacing low-skill natives, by lowering 
wages for low-skill natives (Borjas 1994; Chiswick 1977; Chiswick 1978), and by weakening labor 
unions (Baldwin 2003; Lee 2005). Investigating the relationship between immigration and 
pretax-and-transfer income inequality (commonly referred to as market income inequality) 
could increase our understanding of the mechanisms through which immigration may have 
affected within-country income inequality in recent decades or whether immigration had any 
effects on within-country income inequality at all. 
The welfare state and within-country income inequality 
It has been argued that government policies shape poverty and stratification (Alderson 
and Nielsen 2002; Brady 2005; Kenworthy 1999; Korpi and Palme 1998; Moller et al. 2003). 
Through programs, such as unemployment benefits and skills development training, the 
welfare state may protect workers against misfortunes of the labor market (Katzenstein 1985). 
Skills-training may help both those who lose their jobs due to skill mismatch to gain new skills 
relevant to labor market demand, and can help workers to improve their skills in order to avoid 
job or wage losses due to labor market competition. Through these mechanisms, the welfare 
state may directly shape pretax-and-transfer income inequality. Furthermore, the welfare state 
may control income inequality through programs, such as unemployment benefits, cash 
transfer, family benefits, old-age, and incapacity benefits (Casper, McLanahan, and Garfinkel 
1994; Christopher, England, Smeeding, and Phillips 2002; Moller et al. 2003). Such programs 
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might reduce posttax-and-transfer income inequality. It has been found that posttax-and-
transfer poverty and income inequality tends to be relatively low in societies where the welfare 
state is relatively generous (Kenworthy 1999; Kim 2000; Korpi and Palme 1998; McFate, 
Lawson, and Wilson 1995; Smeeding, Rainwater, and Burtles 2001). That is, because large 
welfare states tend to redistribute more income (Goodin 1999; Kenworthy 1999; Kim 2000). 
Given the redistributive power of the welfare state, one could expect the welfare state to have 
attenuated the effects of globalization on within-country income inequality. As a result, 
research has found that the size of the welfare state mattered for the effect of globalization on 
within-country income inequality. Lee, Nielsen and Alderson have found that foreign direct 
investment had a positive effect on national income inequality at low and medium level of the 
welfare state, while foreign direct investment reduced income inequality at large level of the 
welfare (2007). Although research has found a significant effect of the size of the welfare state 
on income inequality and poverty reduction, other scholars have argued that the quality of the 
welfare state programs matters more than the magnitude for income inequality and poverty 
reduction (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi and Palme 1998). It has been argued that less targeted 
welfare state programs tend to have larger effects on inequality and poverty reduction than 
targeted programs (Korpi and Palme 1998). On the other hand, other research claimed that 
targeted welfare state programs are more efficient in term of poverty and inequality reduction. 
It has been argued that, using targeted social protection programs, some OECD countries that 
had relatively low social protection spending have achieved similar level of poverty reduction as 
some OECD countries that have relatively high social protection spending (OECD 2008: 99-117). 
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Despite a growing body of research showing that the welfare state shapes poverty, 
stratification and inequality, some scholars remain skeptical regarding the ability of the welfare 
state to reduce poverty and income inequality (Cantillion ; Freeman 1999). For example, 
Krugman, analyzing US social policy programs in the 1990s, argued that US social policy 
programs have failed to lift poor Americans out of poverty (Krugman 1997). More extreme 
critics of the welfare state have argued that poverty and inequality reduction can only be 
achieved through economic growth, liberal capitalist market and labor market demand driven 
by workers’ productivity (Gordon 1972; O'Connor 2001). It has been argued that it is economic 
performance of a society that determines its level of poverty and inequality (Ellwood and 
Summers 1985; Freeman 2001). Economic prosperity accompanied with a high employment 
rate should increase the employment rate of the poor, and consequently should decrease 
poverty and income inequality (O'Connor 2001). Critics have also argued that welfare state 
generosity may be counterproductive as it may encourage unemployment, and may decrease 
labor supply by encouraging people to retire early (Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick 1981; 
Moffitt 2000). Furthermore, it has been argued that the welfare state is inefficient, and 
undermines economic productivity by creating the disincentive (Murray 1994). For example, 
some scholars suggest that generosity of the welfare state has created economic inefficiency 
and has undermined economic productivity of Western European economies (Alesina and 
Perotti 1997; Freeman, Topel, and Swedenborg 1997; Lindbeck 1994). Moreover, it has been 
argued that through programs, such as income transfer and unemployment benefits, welfare 
state generosity may contribute to long term poverty by discouraging people to seek 
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employment (Banfield 1970; Gilder 2012; Glazer 1988; Lindbeck 1995; Mead 1986; Murray 
1994). 
Given the controversy regarding the relationship between the welfare state, economic 
development, labor productivity and income inequality, the present study will assess the effect 
of the welfare state on both pretax-and-transfer income inequality, and posttax-and-transfer 
income inequality. That is, to assess the claim that the welfare state lacks the capacity to 
reduce poverty and inequality. This study will also test the hypothesis that the welfare state 
hinders economic prosperity and productivity.  
HYPOTHESES 
H1: International trade (i.e., exports plus imports as a percent of real gross domestic product 
(GDP)) should have a positive effect on pretax-and-transfer income inequality. 
H2: International trade should have no effect on posttax-and-transfer income inequality. 
H3: The effect of international trade on pretax-and-transfer income inequality may be stronger 
in societies where the welfare states and/or wage bargaining institutions are relatively weak.  
H3: Capital outflow (i.e., foreign direct investment) may have a positive effect on pretax-and-
transfer income inequality, but no effect on posttax-and-transfer income inequality. 
H5: Immigration (i.e., foreign born population as percent of native population) should have no 
effect on either pretax-and-transfer or posttax-and-transfer income inequality. 
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H6: The welfare state (i.e., social protection spending as percent of GDP) should have a 
negative effect on posttax-and-transfer income inequality, but should have no effect on pretax-
and-transfer income inequality. 
H7: Unions should have negative effects on both pretax-and-transfer and posttax-and-transfer 
income inequality. 
H8: The welfare state should have no effect on either economic productivity (measured as labor 
productivity) or on economic development (measured as real GDP per capita). 
DATA, VARIABLES, MEASUREMENT AND METHODS 
DATA, VARIABLES AND MEASUREMENT 
The dependent variables are two measures of income inequality: pretax-and-transfer 
Gini coefficient, and post-tax-and-transfer Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient is a commonly 
used measure of income inequality in the income inequality and stratification literature. The 
Gini coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, where zero means complete equality and 1 means complete 
inequality (Firebaugh 2003). The posttax-and-transfer Gini coefficient measures the income gap 
between individuals after taxes and income transfers, which captures the effect of government 
welfare policies, such as taxation and social protection policies on income distribution. The 
pretax-and-transfer Gini coefficient measures the income gap between individuals before taxes 
and income transfers. It is an appropriate measure of income inequality caused by labor market 
dynamics, such as wage competition, decrease in collective bargaining and economic 
restructuring. The Gini coefficient data for this study come from the Standardized World 
Income Inequality Database (Solt 2009). Solt standardized the United Nations income inequality 
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data using a custom missing-data algorithm, which increases the validity of cross-country 
income inequality comparisons.  
Independent Variables  
The independent variables are three aspects of globalization: international trade (i.e., 
exports plus imports as a percent of real GDP), capital flow (i.e., outflow of foreign direct 
investments as a percent of real GDP) and immigration (i.e., foreign born population as a 
percent of native population), and two other variables, social protection spending (measured as 
a percent of GDP) and union density (i.e., the ratio of wage and salary earners who are trade 
union members to the total number of wage and salary earners) that measure the size of the 
welfare state and wage bargaining institutions, respectively. International trade has been 
commonly used in the comparative sociology and international economic literatures as a 
measure of economic globalization (Babones and Vonada 2009; Beckfield 2006b; Brady, 
Beckfield, and Seeleib-Kaiser 2005; Pereira, Jalles, and Andresen 2012; Reuveny and Li 2003). 
Increased international trade across countries would indicate greater economic openness. The 
international trade data are drawn from the Penn World Table (Heston, Summers and Aten 
2012). The capital flow variable is measured as outflows of foreign direct investments, and the 
data are drawn from the OECD’s globalization statistic (various years). Data for the immigration 
variable (i.e., foreign born population as a percent native born population) are drawn from 
OECD’s Demographic and Population Statistics (various years). Data for the wage bargaining 
institutions variable (i.e., union density: the ratio of wage and salary earners who are trade 
union members to the total number of wage and salary earners) are drawn from OECD Labour 
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Force Statistics (various years).  Data for the welfare state variable (i.e., government social 
protection spending as percent of GDP) are drawn from OECD’s Social Policy Statistics (various 
years). Social protection spending (SPS) has been used as a measure of welfare state strength 
and generosity (Fligstein and Stone Sweet 2002; Caporaso 1976; Frankel 1997; Nye 1968; Sapir 
1992). SPS contains public spending on old age, health, family and housing; it also includes 
unemployment, and survivor-and-incapacity-related benefits (OECD 2011). However, due to 
unavailability of data, SPS data used in this study do not include government spending on 
activities, such as skill training and other education programs. Since SPS is a function of income, 
social protection spending as a percentage of gross domestic products is used here instead of 
social protection spending per head (i.e., total social spending divided by total population) in 
order to  control for the effect of income differentials across countries. In addition, three 
control variables were added: real GDP per capita measured at purchasing power parity, labor 
productivity measured as GDP per hour worked, and labor productivity annual growth rate. 
GDP per capita data are drawn from the Penn World Table. Labor productivity and labor 
productivity annual growth rate data are drawn from OECD Labour productivity statistics 
(various years). 
DATA STRUCTURE AND METHOD 
Data structure 
The data set is an unbalanced panel data set composed of a total of 329 observations 
distributed between 25 countries, and observed during 1990-2009 (comprising a total of 20 
years of data). Countries contribute uneven numbers of observations to the data set (see Table 
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1), resulting in the unbalanced nature of the data set. While the Gini coefficient data used in 
this study was standardized in order to improve comparability across nations (Solt 2009), it is 
fair to assume that there will remain significant incompatibility of income inequality across 
nations due to differences in how income is measured and how taxes are calculated across 
countries, and because definitions of income and household vary across countries (income 
inequality calculation is based on household income). Errors resulting from variation in 
measurement of income inequality across countries will reflex in the regression error term and 
will cause the regression errors of a particular country to be correlated across time. Regarding 
this panel data set, the inconsistency in the measurement of income across countries causes 
heterogeneity in the data. That is, errors related to a particular country are correlated across 
time.  This makes ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, which assumes independence 
between regression errors, inappropriate for this type of data. Using OLS for this type of data 
would underestimate the standard error of the model (Greene 2003; Hsiao 2003). In addition to 
variation in measurement of income across countries, country-specific time invariant factors 
can also bias income inequality estimates. Some factors that are unique to countries, and that 
are constant or that vary little over time (e.g., welfare state policies and labor market 
institutions) can affect income inequality in a specific country at any point in time. Failure to 
control for country-specific and time invariant components could cause the regression errors 
across different data points in the same country to be correlated (Alderson and Nielsen 2002). 
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Estimation techniques 
The random-effects and fixed-effects methods are two common estimation techniques 
that have been used to correct for unmeasured country-specific and time invariant factors 
(Brady 2009; Gustafsson and Johansson 1999; Kollmeyer 2009; Nielsen and Alderson 1995). 
Both the random-effects model and the fixed-effects model estimate time-invariant factors as 
country-specific intercepts. The fixed effects method estimates a time-invariant intercept and 
assigns all between-country variations to that intercept, while keeping within-country variation. 
The fixed-effects method does not estimate effects of variables that do not change over time 
for a given country because they are correlated with the country specific intercepts (Alderson 
and Nielsen 2002). Consequently, the fixed-effects model only estimates the effects of variables 
that vary both across countries and across time (Alderson and Nielsen 2002). On the other 
hand, the random-effects model treats the time-invariant intercepts as random factors (Nielsen 
and Alderson 1995).  The random-effects estimation is similar to OLS estimation after 
subtracting from the data set a portion of country-specific means as opposed to subtracting the 
entire country specific means, as the fixed-effects estimation does (Nielsen and Alderson 1995). 
Consequently, the random-effects throws out fewer country specific data than the fixed-effects 
does. Moreover, the random-effects method also estimates time invariant variables. In this 
study, some of the key explanatory variables (e.g., the welfare state and wage bargaining 
institutions) tend to vary across countries, but tend to vary little across time.  
Moreover, it has been argued that across-country variations in income inequality are 
mainly due to institutional differences as opposed to international forces, such as globalization 
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(DiPrete 2005; Morris and Western 1999; Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Western and Healy 
1999). Other research has argued that variations in within-country income inequality between 
various OECD member countries, for example, were due to economic productivity differences 
(Chan-Lee, Coe, and Prywes 1987; Glyn 1994; Harrison and Bluestone 1988). It has also been 
suggested that generosity of Western European welfare states has been accompanied with low 
productivity (Alesina and Perotti 1997; Freeman, Topel, and Swedenborg 1997; Lindbeck 1994). 
Since the random-effects model estimates both within and between-country variation in 
addition to controlling for time invariant factors, such as institutions and country’s experience 
with income inequality, the random-effects estimation will enable this study to assess the 
importance of cross-country variation in globalization and domestic factors for cross-country 
variation in income inequality. Controlling for cross-country variation in domestic factors will 
help to evaluate the claim that cross-country variation in income inequality might have been 
due to economic productivity differences across countries. The fixed-effects will permit 
estimation of changes over time.  And, since it drops between-country variation, it will allow 
assessment of the importance of globalization for longitudinal changes in within-country 
income inequality. As a result, estimates from both fixed-effects and random-effects models 
are presented here. Following is the model to be estimated: 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝒳𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑘=1 + 𝛼𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
Y is the dependent variable(s), such as pretax-and-transfer, and posttax-and-transfer Gini 
coefficient. 𝛼 is the general intercept of the model, and 𝛼𝑖 captures country specific factors that 
do not change with time. The ᵢ and ᵼ identify the country and time of the observation, 
respectively. The letter i stands for number of countries varying from 1 to N (i.e., i= 1, …, N), 
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while the letter t stands for number of years of observation and varies from 1 to T (i.e., t = 1, …, 
Ti).  
RESULTS 
Tables 4 and 5 present the random-effects and fixed-effects models of the pretax-and-
transfer and posttax-and-transfer Gini coefficients on three measures of globalization and other 
selected control variables. Results from both the fixed-effects and the random-effects models 
in Table 4 and 5 show that international trade and immigration had no effects on the posttax-
and-transfer Gini coefficient. Outflows of foreign direct investment showed some effect on the 
posttax-and-transfer Gini coefficient, but this effect disappeared when social protection 
spending was controlled for (Table 4 & 5, models 6 & 8). These results are consistent with the 
hypothesized effect of globalization on posttax-and-transfer income inequality and suggest that 
the welfare state might have attenuated the effects of globalization on within-country income 
inequality. Model 1 in Table 4 and 5 shows estimates for the three measures of globalization: 
international trade, outflows of foreign direct investment and immigration on pretax-and-
transfer income inequality. Neither immigration nor foreign direct investment had an effect on 
pretax-and-transfer income inequality. However, international trade has a significant and 
positive effect on pretax-and-transfer income inequality (p<0.01). These results suggest that 
international trade might have affected within-country income distribution primarily through 
the labor market. Moreover, results from both the random-effects and the fixed-effects models 
showed that unions had a negative and significant effect on both the pretax-and-transfer and 
posttax-and-transfer Gini coefficients. These results are consistent with the hypothesized 
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effects of unions on the pretax-and-transfer and posttax-and-transfer Gini coefficients. These 
results are also consistent with previous research that has found negative effects of unions on 
the posttax-and-transfer Gini coefficient. The results support the argument that institutional 
variation, such wage bargaining institutions, may have affected cross-country variation in 
income inequality (see RE results) (Alderson and Nielsen 2002; Brady 2009; DiPrete 2005; 
Moller et al. 2003; Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Wallerstein 1999; Western and Healy 1999). 
Unions have also affected longitudinal changes in income inequality (see FE results, Table 5). As 
hypothesized, SPS had no effect on pretax-and-transfer Gini coefficient, but it had a negative 
effect on posttax-and-transfer Gini coefficient. SPS data used in this analysis did not include 
government spending on programs, such as labor market skill building programs, and other 
educational programs, that are likely to affect pretax-and-transfer income distribution (i.e., 
market income distribution). Pretax-and-transfer Gini coefficient was calculated using pretax-
and-transfer income. The absence of data on government spending (e.g., spending on 
education and labor market skill development programs) that are likely to have direct effects on 
the labor market income may explain why the results showed no effects of SPS on pretax-and-
transfer income inequality.  
In model 5, Table 4, international trade and union density interaction was estimated to 
test whether the effect of international trade on pretax-and-transfer Gini coefficient varied by 
cross-country variation in union level. The estimated interaction was non-significant, which 
suggests that the effect of international trade on within-country income inequality did not 
change with cross-national variation in union density (Table 4, model 3). The international trade 
and SPS interaction term is also insignificant (Table 4, model 9), which suggests that the welfare 
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state does not explain differential effects of international trade on within-country income 
inequality. GDP per capita and labor productivity were also controlled for. Results from 
random-effects showed that GDP per capita has a positive effect on pretax-and-transfer Gini 
coefficient (Table 4, model 4), but it has no effect on posttax-and-transfer Gini coefficient 
(Table 4, model 9). Results from the fixed-effects estimations (Table 5, model 4 & 9) showed 
that GDP per capita had positive effects on both pretax-and-transfer, and posttax-and-transfer 
Gini coefficients. These results are consistent with previous research arguing that income 
inequality tends to increase with economic development (Alderson and Nielsen 2002; Babones 
and Vonada 2009). The results also show that the effect of economic development on income 
inequality varied by measure of income inequality and estimation techniques. While GDP per 
capita is positively related to pretax-and-transfer and posttax-and-transfer income inequality, 
the magnitude of the effect of GDP per capita is about 1.52 times greater for pretax-and-
transfer income inequality than it is for posttax-and-transfer income inequality (Table 5, model 
4 & 9). The difference in the size of the effect of GDP per capita on the two measures of Gini 
coefficient suggests that the welfare state may have attenuated the effect of economic 
development on income inequality. Labor productivity was also controlled for in order to test 
the claim that income inequality upswings observed in recent decades were due to changes in 
labor market structures, such as labor productivity as opposed to globalization forces (Bhagwati 
and Kosters 1994; Gordon 1994a). Results from the random-effects estimation (Table 4, model 
4) showed that labor productivity had no effects on either pretax-and-transfer Gini coefficient 
or on posttax-and-transfer Gini coefficient (Table 4, model 4 & 9). However, results from the 
fixed-effects estimations (Table 5, model 6) showed that labor productivity affected both 
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pretax-and-transfer, and posttax-and-transfer Gini coefficient. The random-effects estimations, 
while correcting for possible heterogeneity inherent to the type of data structure used in this 
study (i.e., panel data), controlled for variation within and between units. Regarding the 
present study, the random-effects model controlled for effects of cross-country variation in 
labor productivity on cross-country variation in within-country income inequality. The 
insignificance of the estimates of labor productivity in the random-effects modeling indicates 
that cross-country variation in labor productivity had no effect on cross-country differences in 
within-country income inequality. Thus, these results provide no support for the claim that 
cross-country variation in economic productivity accounted for cross-country variation in 
within-country income inequality. As opposed to the random-effects estimation (Table 4, model 
4), the fixed-effects estimations (Table 5, model 6) showed that labor productivity had an effect 
on both pretax-and-transfer, and posttax-and-transfer Gini coefficient. Similar to the random-
effects estimation, the fixed-effects model corrected for heterogeneity inherent to the type of 
data used in this study. However, the fixed-effects technique estimates changes within unit 
over time (i.e., changes within-country over time), while dropping between-units variation (i.e., 
between-country variation). Thus, the estimates of labor productivity presented in model 6 
(Table 5) show the effects of within-country longitudinal changes in labor productivity on 
longitudinal changes in within-country income inequality. The significance of the estimate of 
labor productivity (Table 5, model 4) indicates that within-country variation in labor 
productivity mattered for within-nation variation in income inequality. This suggests that 
variation in labor productivity between individuals within-country might have affected within-
country income inequality observed in industrial countries in recent decades. However, labor 
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productivity had no effect on cross-country variation in within-country income inequality, 
suggesting that economic productivity differentials were not the reasons for within-country 
income inequality differentials between the countries under study. 
Table 6 presents results for fixed-effects and random-effects models testing the claim 
that the welfare state is counterproductive, and the claim that the welfare state retards 
economic growth by hindering economic productivity. It has been argued that, through 
programs, such as unemployment and cash transfer, welfare state generosity might have 
exacerbated poverty and inequality by discouraging people to seek employment and by 
encouraging those who worked to retire early (Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick 1981; Moffitt 
2000). Contrasting the above argument, both the fixed-effects and random-effects models 
show that social protection spending, which included unemployment benefit and cash transfer 
among others, had no effects on either labor productivity or GDP per capita. In other words, the 
results suggest that the welfare state did not hinder economic prosperity or hamper economic 
efficiency over the period under review in this study. 
DSCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper revisited some of the claims regarding the relationship between within-
country income inequality and three aspects of globalization: international trade, foreign direct 
investment and immigration. Most studies investigating the relationship between within-
country income inequality and globalization have used posttax-and-transfer income inequality. 
Some of those studies have concluded that globalization had no effect on income inequality 
(see above review), while others have argued that globalization had significant effects on 
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income inequality upswings observed in advanced industrial economies in recent decades (see 
above review). Unlike previous studies, this study investigated the effect of globalization on 
both pretax-and-transfer, and posttax-and-transfer income inequality. Consistent with some 
research (Nollmann 2006), the results showed that globalization had no effect of on posttax-
and-transfer income inequality. This relationship is the same regardless of the estimation 
method used (fixed-effects or random-effect methods). However, the relationship between 
globalization and income inequality changed when pretax-and-transfer Gini coefficient was 
considered. The results showed that international trade affected both cross-country variations 
(see random-effects estimates, Table 4, models 1-5) and longitudinal changes (see fixed-effects 
estimate, Table 5, models 1-6) in income inequality. The fact that international trade had an 
effect on pretax-and-transfer income inequality, but did not have any effects on posttax-and-
transfer income inequality highlights the extent to which the welfare state might have 
attenuated the effects of globalization on within-country income inequality in industrial 
countries. The results also suggest that conclusions regarding the relationship between 
globalization may depend on measures of income inequality. Research may find effects of 
globalization on income inequality or no effects of globalization on income inequality 
depending upon whether pretax-and-transfer Gini coefficient or posttax-and-transfer Gini 
coefficient is considered. Moreover, the argument that cross-country variation in within-
country income inequality was due to cross-country variation in economic productivity seemed 
to depend on methods of estimation. Random-effects estimations show no effects of cross-
country variation in economic productivity on cross-country variation in within-country income 
inequality. Fixed-effects estimates showed that economic productivity differences between 
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individuals within-country had an effect on longitudinal changes in within-country income 
inequality.  
Furthermore, this study tested the claim that any reduction of income inequality by the 
welfare state programs happens at the expense of economic prosperity, productivity and 
growth. The results showed no evidence that the welfare state hindered economic productivity 
and economic growth in the 25 countries over the period under study. An implication of these 
findings is that a society does not have to forgo economic growth in order to reduce income 
inequality.  
Moreover, this study provides no support for the argument that cross-national variation 
in within-country income inequality may have been due to cross-country variation in economic 
productivity. For example, it has been argued that income inequality has been greater in the US 
than it has been in some European countries because the US has had on average higher 
economic productivity than these European countries. Results from random-effects modeling 
showed that cross-country variation in labor productivity had no effect on cross-country 
variation in income inequality during the period under study. Although the results reject the 
claim that the welfare state is counterproductive and the claim that the welfare state retards 
economic development, one could expect the welfare state to stimulate economic 
development and economic growth through labor market skill training and other educational 
programs. Unfortunately, due to unavailability of data on government spending on education 
and skill training programs, this paper could not measure whether the welfare state had 
increased economic productivity, economic development and growth over the 1990-2009 
31 
 
period. When such data become available, further research may shed light on the full extent of 
the effect of the welfare state on economic development and productivity and income 
inequality. Moreover, the results have shown no effect of immigration on income inequality, 
which is consistent with previous studies that have found small or insignificant effects of 
immigration on posttax-and-transfer income inequality (Alderson and Nielsen 2002; Brady 
2009). However, the insignificance of the estimate of immigration might have been due to 
unmeasured factors, such as variation in skill set of immigrants and cross-country difference in 
immigrant recruitment methods that could not be captured from cross-sectional time series 
data and aggregate measures of immigration. Since immigration policies tend to affect the type 
of people who migrate (Bleakley and Chin 2004; Green 1999; Kossoudji 1988; LaLonde and 
Topel 1991a; Lobo and Salvo 1998a; Lobo and Salvo 1998b), further study could investigate how 
the effect of immigration on within-country income inequality might have changed in industrial 
countries in recent decades due to changes in immigration policies. Finally, a surprising finding 
of this study is that unions had a negative effect on economic productivity and development 
(see Table 6). More research is required before this finding should be considered conclusive. 
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Table 1: Mean pretax-and-transfer, and posttax-and-transfer Gini coefficient and number of 
years by countries, 1990-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
Countries Years 
Pretax-and-transfer Gini 
coefficient 
Posttax-and-transfer Gini 
coefficient 
Australia 1990 & 1999-2009 43.04 30.96 
Austria 1998-2009 47.32 26.57 
Belgium 2002-2007 38.75 25.54 
Canada 1990-2009 41.95 30.31 
Chile 2002-2009 51.00 49.49 
Czech Republic 1998-2004 & 2006-2009 41.83 25.79 
Denmark 1990-2003 & 2005-2009 48.01 23.49 
Estonia 2000-2009 38.85 33.75 
Finland 1995-2002 & 2002-2009 45.34 24.19 
France 1999-2008 49.18 27.33 
Germany 1994-2003 & 2005-2009 50.05 28.23 
Hungary 1995 & 1997-2008 45.46 28.76 
Ireland 1996-2009 41.87 31.30 
Luxembourg 2002-2008 42.71 27.81 
Mexico 2005-2009 47.01 45.68 
Netherlands 1990-2009 44.71 25.69 
New Zealand 1998-2000, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2007 44.97 32.94 
Norway 1991, 1993-2009 44.94 23.83 
Portugal 1995-2009 58.03 35.22 
Slovak Republic 2001-2008 36.11 24.37 
Spain 1997-2009 38.64 32.37 
Sweden 1992-2009 45.94 22.77 
Switzerland 1994-2008 43.08 28.60 
United Kingdom 1991-2009 47.98 34.37 
United States 1990-2009 46.28 36.21 
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Figure 1: Mean pretax-and-transfer Gini coefficient multiplied by 100, 1990-2009. 
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Figure 2:  Mean social protection spending as a percent of GDP, 1990-2009. 
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Figure 3: Mean union density as a percent of total wage and salary earners, 1990-2009. 
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Figure 4: Mean posttax-and-transfer Gini coefficient multiplied by 100, 1990-2009. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Pretax-and-transfer Gini coefficient 329 45.26 4.80 34.55 61.69 
Posttax-and-transfer Gini coefficient 329 29.60 5.66 21.56 50.93 
International trade 329 82.99 46.76 16.21 326.54 
Outflow of direct investment 329 22.99 1.91 16.22 26.75 
Immigrant population 329 11.24 7.00 0.56 37.27 
Union density 329 33.63 21.16 7.05 83.89 
Social protection spending 326 21.12 5.40 6.90 35.70 
Labor productivity 329 327.57 913.57 7.00 5808.50 
Labor productivity growth rate 328 1.94 2.02 -8.20 8.10 
GDP per capita 329 12.85 1.38 9.43 16.47 
 
  
 
Table 3: Variable descriptions, Data Sources and Hypothesized Effects 
      Hypothesized impact on: 
Variables Description Sources 
Pretax-and-transfer 
Gini coefficient 
Posttax-and-transfer 
Gini coefficient 
Dependent Variables 
    
Pretax-and-transfer Gini coefficient Calculated from pretax-and-transfer household income, using custom missing-data algorithm SWID (Solt 2009) 
  
Posttax-and-transfer Gini coefficient Calculated from posttax-and-transfer household income, using custom missing-data algorithm SWID (solt 2009) 
  Labor productivity Measured as GDP per hour worked OECD 
  
GDP per capita GDP divided per population size Penn World Table 
  
Independent Variables 
    International trade exports plus imports of goods in PPP price as a percent of real GDP  Penn World Table + N/A 
Outward of direct investment Total direct investment abroad as a percent of real GDP OECD + + 
immigrant population foreign born population as percent of native population OECD + + 
social protection spending Government social spending as a percent of GDP OECD N/A - 
Union density Union membership as a percent of total wage and salary earners OECD - - 
Labor productivity Measured as GDP per hour worked OECD - - 
Labor productivity growth rate Percent change in labor production per year OECD - - 
GDP per capita GDP divided per population size Penn World Table + + 
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Table 4: Random-Effects GLS Regression Models of Income Inequality (Gini coefficient) on Selected Independent Variables: 25 Countries, 1990 to 2009 
 Pretax-and-transfer Gini coefficient  Posttax-and-transfer Gini coefficient 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 
           
International Trade  (exports +imports, %of GDP*) 0.0370*** 0.0211** 0.0247** 0.0307*** 0.0380**  0.00788 -0.0128* -0.0111* -0.0248 
 (0.00967) (0.0105) (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0164)  (0.00545) (0.00674) (0.00636) (0.0151) 
FDI (outflow of capital,  % of GDP*) 0.0864 0.0294 0.0353 -0.0880 -0.0895  0.129** 0.120* 0.0810 0.0603 
 (0.131) (0.129) (0.129) (0.132) (0.132)  (0.0654) (0.0642) (0.0618) (0.0643) 
Immigrant pop. (as a % of native pop.) -0.0525 -0.0919 -0.138* -0.226*** -0.226***  0.00622 -0.0297 -0.0679 -0.0883* 
 (0.0762) (0.0758) (0.0800) (0.0851) (0.0858)  (0.0442) (0.0435) (0.0437) (0.0474) 
Union density (as a % of salary and wage earners)  -0.127*** -0.151*** -0.108*** -0.0935*   -0.108*** -0.156*** -0.147*** 
  (0.0319) (0.0344) (0.0402) (0.0498)   (0.0224) (0.0216) (0.0239) 
Social Protection Spending (as a % of GDP)   0.121 0.117 0.110    -0.116*** -0.164*** 
   (0.0746) (0.0744) (0.0755)    (0.0376) (0.0622) 
GDP per capita (logged)    1.694*** 1.721***     0.443 
    (0.561) (0.570)     (0.349) 
Labor productivity    -0.000832 -0.000946     0.000711 
    (0.000764) (0.000780)     (0.000479) 
Labor productivity growth rate    0.138* 0.138*     0.0241 
    (0.0718) (0.0718)     (0.0351) 
International trade X union density     -0.000235      
     (0.000408)      
International trade X Social Protection Spending          0.000509 
          (0.000645) 
Constant 42.03*** 48.03*** 46.45*** 24.31*** 23.74***  29.30*** 35.06*** 39.23*** 34.50*** 
 (1.266) (1.992) (2.380) (7.790) (7.973)  (1.426) (1.678) (1.605) (4.847) 
           
Observations 329 329 326 325 325  329 329 326 325 
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 25  25 25 25 25 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
* GDP = real GDP 
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Table 5: Fixed-Effects GLS Regression Models of Income Inequality (Gini coefficient) on Selected Independent Variables: 25 Countries, 1990 to 2009  
 Pretax-and-transfer Gini coefficient  Posttax-and-transfer Gini coefficient 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5          6 7 8 9 10 
International Trade (exports +imports, %of GDP*)      0.0606*** 0.0252* 0.0281*     0.0455*** 0.0604***  0.00909 -0.00878 -0.00801 -0.00641 -0.0203 
 (0.0111) (0.0150) (0.0155) (0.0162) (0.0185)  (0.00557) (0.00752) (0.00738) (0.00777) (0.0158) 
FDI (outflow of capital, as a of  % of GDP*) -0.0200 -0.0254 -0.0279 -0.124 -0.129  0.122* 0.120* 0.0863 0.0446 0.0445 
 (0.131) (0.129) (0.129) (0.128) (0.127)  (0.0657) (0.0645) (0.0613) (0.0610) (0.0610) 
Immigrant pop. (% of native pop.) -0.0452 -0.101 -0.181* -0.358*** -0.365***  0.0110 -0.0169 -0.0690 -0.193*** -0.201*** 
 (0.0906) (0.0904) (0.0975) (0.125) (0.125)  (0.0455) (0.0454) (0.0463) (0.0599) (0.0604) 
Union density (as a % of salary and wage earners)  -0.176*** -0.229*** -0.147** -0.121*   -0.0889*** -0.148*** -0.0987*** -0.0941*** 
  (0.0511) (0.0558) (0.0693) (0.0709)   (0.0257) (0.0266) (0.0331) (0.0334) 
Social Protection Spending (as a % of GDP)   0.0662 0.102 0.0711    -0.0845** -0.0722* -0.121** 
   (0.0808) (0.0783) (0.0803)    (0.0384) (0.0375) (0.0610) 
GDP* per capita (logged)    2.495** 2.648**     1.646*** 1.766*** 
    (1.220) (1.220)     (0.584) (0.595) 
Labor productivity    0.00660*** 0.00680***     0.00202*** 0.00210*** 
    (0.00158) (0.00158)     (0.000756) (0.000759) 
Labor productivity growth rate    0.190*** 0.187***     0.0425 0.0457 
    (0.0696) (0.0694)     (0.0333) (0.0334) 
International trade X union density     -0.000714       
     (0.000433)       
International trade X Social Protection Spending           0.000639 
           (0.000632) 
Constant 40.76*** 50.25*** 51.32*** 18.07 16.81  28.60*** 33.39*** 37.71*** 16.45** 15.93** 
 (0.942) (2.906) (3.568) (16.26) (16.23)  (0.473) (1.459) (1.696) (7.778) (7.795) 
Observations 329 329 326 325 325  329 329 326 325 325 
R-squared 0.112 0.146 0.154 0.222 0.229  0.032 0.070 0.158 0.206 0.209 
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 25  25 25 25 25 25 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; *GDP = real GDP 
4
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Table 6: Random-Effects and Fixed-Effects GLS Regression Models of Labor Productivity and GDP per Capita on Selected 
Independent Variables: 25 Countries, 1990-2009 
 Random-effects  Fixed-effects 
VARIABLES Labor productivity GDP per capita  Labor productivity GDP per capita 
      
Social Protection Spending (as a % of GDP) -3.072 0.00647  -2.810 0.00502 
 (3.096) (0.00546)  (3.108) (0.00542) 
Union density (% of salary and wage earners)  -4.221*** -0.0617***  -4.158*** -0.0632*** 
 (1.454) (0.00255)  (1.467) (0.00256) 
Constant 598.2** 14.47***  511.5*** 14.88*** 
 (238.8) (0.309)  (80.94) (0.141) 
      
Observations 326 326  326 326 
R-squared    0.029 0.672 
Number of countries 25 25  25 25 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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